Illustration of a high school above a gun. Concept illustration of bad occurrence related to shooting in school premises.

Punishing the Parent – Should the Parents of a School Shooter Be Criminally Liable for their Parental Failures?

Punishing the Parent – Should the Parents of a School Shooter Be Criminally Liable for their Parental Failures?

April 16, 2024

Punishing the Parent – Should the Parents of a School Shooter Be Criminally Liable for their Parental Failures?

By: Abbey Block

Can being a bad parent make you a criminal? A jury in Michigan recently answered yes in the case of Jennifer and James Crumbley – the parents of high school mass shooter, Ethan Crumbley.

Although neither Mr. nor Mrs. Crumbley fired a single shot during the school shooting that killed four students (and injured six other people), last week they were each sentenced to ten years in prison for involuntary manslaughter.

The high school shooting, which took place nearly three years ago in Oxford, Michigan is undoubtedly a horrific tragedy. Nobody questions that the shooter, Ethan, should be punished severely for his actions. Indeed, in 2023, Ethan, who was charged as an adult (despite being fifteen at the time of shooting) pled guilty to more than nineteen criminal charges, including four counts of murder, and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Similarly, nobody would disagree that Jennifer and James Crumbley are unsympathetic figures who will never qualify as “parents of the year.”  They purchased the gun used in the shooting for their son as a Christmas gift and failed to intervene (and secure the gun) when Ethan was showing signs of mental distress.

But the conviction and sentencing of the shooter’s parents presents a novel application of the law and raises the question – just how far does the causal chain of criminal liability extend?

It’s important to note, the Crumbley parents weren’t charged with murder, but instead with involuntary manslaughter. Michigan law has described involuntary manslaughter as a “catch-all concept,” encompassing killings committed with gross negligence.[1] To prove gross negligence, the prosecution must establish (1) a defendant’s knowledge of a situation requiring the use of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another, (2) the defendant’s ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand, and (3) the defendant’s failure to use care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when, to the ordinary mind, it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another.[2] Simply put, a person may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter if they fail to appreciate the risks of a dangerous situation and fail to take reasonable steps to avoid injury to others that is likely to result therefrom – i.e., fail to use “ordinary care.”  Thus, liability can extend even if the defendant never intended to cause the death.

In the Crumbley case, prosecutors argued that Ethan’s parents acted with gross negligence given that they bought their son a lethal weapon even when he was showing signs of mental distress – e.g., creating violent drawings and even asking his parents to take him to a doctor for mental health treatment. Similarly, when Ethan’s school caught him conducting an online search for firearm ammunition, rather than punishing her son or securing the firearm in their home, Ethan’s mother texted “LOL I’m not mad at you. You have to learn not to get caught.” Perhaps most problematic, Ethan’s parents chose not to remove him from school on the day of the shooting, even after being called by a school counselor who had concerns about Ethan mental state.[3] Given these circumstances, the Government contended that Ethan’s parents failed to act with the requisite ordinary care to prevent their son from accessing the firearm, even when there were obvious signs that he was mentally unwell.

In response, the Crumbley parents argued that they had no idea that their son would contemplate, much less carry out, violence against his schoolmates. To this end, Mrs. Crumbley testified that although her son had expressed anxiety related to typical teenager matters (tests, college, etc.) it was never “to a level where [she] felt he needed to see a psychiatrist or mental health professional right away.” Arguably bolstering the defense’s position is the fact that (1) Ethan was charged and convicted as an adult; and (2) at sentencing, Ethan stated that he was solely responsible for the shooting and that he had not told his parents about his violent intentions.

While the facts of the Crumbley case are particularly egregious, the criminal prosecution of parents for their children’s actions may create a slippery slope of liability.  It may seem obvious that a teenager with mental health problems shouldn’t be given a gun as a Christmas present. But does the logic so easily extend to other potentially dangerous situations?

Everyone acknowledges that teenagers often lack good judgment and are prone to engaging in risky behavior. Does this mean that a parent fails to exercise ordinary care when they hand their car keys over to their sixteen-year-old with a brand-new driver’s license? If that teenager fails to check her blind spot, or goes over the speed limit – and kills someone as a result – should the parent be held liable for manslaughter? Similarly, if a teenager hosts a party while their parents are out of town, and a guest dies of alcohol poisoning as a result, can the teen’s parents be held criminally liable despite being hundreds of miles away?

It’s true that under general principles of law, parents can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible for the misdeeds of their children. For example, under a theory of parental negligence, “when a person is injured by the act of a child which proximately results from negligent parental supervision over the child, the injured party has a valid cause of action against the parents.”[4] This means that if you fail to supervise your child and he causes someone harm, you can be on the hook. Similarly, parents can be held criminally accountable for their child’s truancy.

Yet, the Crumbley case is the first of its kind. At the time the Crumbley parents were charged, there had yet to be a case in which the parents of a school shooter were alleged to be criminally liable for their inability to recognize and intervene to prevent their child’s violent behavior.[5]

On the one hand, prosecutors argue that the threat of criminal liability is a necessary deterrent – i.e., perhaps if parents know that they can face criminal penalties for their child’s actions, they will be less likely to keep a dangerous firearm in their or home, or, alternatively, will take greater care to secure their firearms in a gun safe. But on the other hand, it seems that most parents are likely already motivated, for obvious reasons, to prevent their child from becoming the next notorious school shooter. To this end, it seems that most (if not all) parents would not require the extra deterrent of potential criminal liability as a motivation to prevent their child from killing their teachers and classmates.

Perhaps charging a school shooter’s parents criminally is our collective attempt to solve a broader societal issue. When a school shooting occurs, the community (and the country) want answers: How did this happen? What could have been done to stop it? And we, as a society, want justice for those who were killed.  But the question is whether, in that quest for justice, we have lost sight of what it means to be a diligent parent exercising ordinary care.

We all know that teenagers are skilled in keeping secrets, and their parents can’t be everywhere at once. Even the most caring, diligent, and tuned-in parents may miss the signs that their child is in distress. Indeed, the mother of one of the Columbine shooters, Susan Klebold, wrote in an essay that she had “no inkling” that her son was mentally ill or planning a massacre. Only after the school shooting did Klebold uncover her son’s journal, which revealed his dark intent and suicidal thoughts.

This leads to the question – what does it mean to act with ordinary care? In most innocuous circumstances, the answer is obvious: you should look both ways before crossing the street or drive within the speed limit in a residential neighborhood. But when it comes to parenthood, the answer is less obvious. If exercising ordinary care requires a parent to know about and control all facets of their teenager’s life, perhaps the scope of liability has been stretched too far. Although we as a society want to prevent the next mass shooting, it seems that the criminalization of deficient parenting shouldn’t be our ultimate solution.

[1] People v. Holtschlag, 684 N.W.2d 730, 742 (Mich. 2004).

[2] People v. Albers, 672 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).

[3] The Crumbley case also raises questions about the potential liability of school counselors and teachers, many of whom qualify as mandatory reporters, who fail to intervene to prevent school shootings.

[4] American States Ins. Co. v. Albin, 324 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).

[5] Since the initiation of the Crumbley case, the mother a six-year-old who brought a gun to school and shot his teacher was criminally charged after the shooting. However, the mother wasn’t charged with assault, but rather, with using marijuana while in possession of a firearm and making a false statement about her drug use during the purchase of the firearm. Most recently, the assistant principal of the boy’s school was charged with eight felony counts of child neglect for her failure to intervene and prevent the shooting, despite receiving reports that the child was in possession of a gun at school. It is evident that in such circumstances, prosecutors exercise significant discretion in their charging decisions.

Abbey Block

Abbey Block

Abbey Block found her path in law as a journalism major, coupling her passion for advocacy through writing with her litigation experience to create persuasive, effective arguments.

Prior to joining Ifrah Law, Abbey served as a judicial law clerk in Delaware’s Kent County Superior Court, where she was exposed to both trial and appellate court litigation. Her work included analyzing case law, statutes, pleadings, depositions and hearing transcripts to draft bench memoranda and provide recommendations to the judge.

How Thick is the Blanket? – Preemptive Pardons as a Presidential Power
White-Collar Crimes |
Dec 6, 2024

How Thick is the Blanket? – Preemptive Pardons as a Presidential Power

By: James Trusty
The Challenging Terrain of White-Collar Sentencing
White-Collar Crimes |
Jun 3, 2024

The Challenging Terrain of White-Collar Sentencing

By: James Trusty
Was FTX Collapse as Bad as Enron? In sentencing SBF, Judge Kaplan Says Yes
White-Collar Crimes |
Apr 1, 2024

Was FTX Collapse as Bad as Enron? In sentencing SBF, Judge Kaplan Says Yes

By: Jeffrey Hamlin
Reading the Plea Leaves
White-Collar Crimes |
Oct 25, 2023

Reading the Plea Leaves

By: James Trusty

Subscribe to Ifrah Law’s Insights